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PLEA OF GUILTY AS AN ADMISSION
By WLLIAM E. DoE
William E. Doyle was born in Denver; A.B., University of Colorado; LL.B., George Washington University. Admitted to practice 1938; deputy district attorney 1937-1941; chief deputy
district attorney, 1948-1952; district judge interim term 1948;
instructor in Westminster Law School since 1946; visiting lecturer, University of Colorado Law School, since 1948; has been
in private practice since admitted; in association with John A.
Carroll and Rothgerber, Appel & Powers.
This case note is the result of the comment of E. B. Hamilton of
Durango upon the very terse statements of this author in his cryptic annual review of evidence (Dicta, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, Page 32),
in discussing Ripple v. Brack, C.B.A. Ad. Sh., Vol. VII, Page 446,
1955.
The treatment of the case which received the criticism, reads
as follows:
"In a civil damage action it was error to allow counsel for
Plaintiff to cross-examine the patrol officer concerning the
plea entered by the Defendant in a criminal case tried before
a justice of the peace. Such questions are immaterial in a civil
action and are, of course, highly prejudicial."
The criticism of Mr. Hamilton, which was addressed to the editor of Dicta, is interesting and is worthy of full mention here. Mr.
Hamilton stated:
"We view with some surprise the comment of the Honorable William Doyle to the case above cited. Although the
Court's opinion does not conclusively so indicate, the defendant in this case did plead guilty to a traffic violation. In the
vast majority of the states, such a plea, when made by a party,
is an admission which may properly be admitted into evidence.
"The Court relied on CRS 13-4-140, 'No record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this article shall be
admissible in any court in any civil action. Certainly the plain
meaning of this statute does not interfere with the introduction
of a record of conviction which prejudices a jury by permitting
it to consider the conclusions of some other trier of the facts.
"Regardless of Mr. Doyle's opinion as to what the law
should be, this case, which stands nearly alone in the field of
evidence, and which is one of first impression in Colorado, is
worthy of comment of more than two sentences."
Ordinarily, brevity is a desirable virtue, but it can be, and undoubtedly in this instance was, carried too far. Mr. Hamilton is
correct in his statement that the case is sufficiently interesting to
warrant extended comment. Mr. Hamilton's other criticism is also
well taken. He is quite right in his assertion that as a general rule,
a plea of guilty in a criminal case is admissible as an admission
against the party making it where it is material to the issue which
is being tried.
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There is, however, one other interesting question, and that is
whether the statutory provision, C.R.S. 13-4-140, should be narrowly construed so as to exclude a record of conviction, but at the
same time allowing the introduction of a plea of guilty as an admission.
Although reasonable legal minds could differ on this, my own
viewpoint is that when the legislature declares a policy calling for
the exclusion of convictions, full effect should be given to it, and a
plea of guilty should be held to come within the legislative declaration. There are good reasons for so holding. First, a plea of guilty
is a conviction. Once the plea is received and recorded, the only
thing remaining for the Court to do in order to make this a final
judgment is to pronounce sentence. A taking of evidence is not
a necessary requisite. See C.R.S. 39-7-8 and see also Lacomy v.
People.' The second reason for so construing the statute is that
many people plead guilty to traffic offenses in order to avoid the
trouble and embarrassment of a trial and, therefore, the legislature
could very well recognize that such a plea of guilty has no probative value and this would be more true of a plea of guilty than a
conviction. Consequently, in the light of this reason, there is more
basis for excluding a conviction following a plea of not-guilty.
In the Ripple case, the Plaintiff had apparently tendered a plea
of guilty into evidence although this is not apparent from the record. Insofar as the Court held that the statute applied to convictions based upon pleas of guilty it is believed that the opinion is
correct.
There is one other feature about the decision which is interesting, and that is that neither the plea of guilty nor the record of
conviction were received in evidence and yet the Supreme Court
held that the case should be reversed because of the conduct of
counsel in offering the testimony. It is doubtful whether the prohibition of the statute extends to mere tendering of the evidence,
particularly under the circumstances which are revealed by this
record. The objectionable question was propounded by counsel
for the Plaintiff while examining a patrolman. This, together with
statements of counsel, reads as follows:
"Q. Do you remember when we took your deposition in
Golden, you were going to check and see what plea Mr. Ripple
entered on the charge that you filed against him in the Justice
of Peace Court; did you do that?
"Mr. O'Dell: Just a minute. We object to that.
"Q. He said in his deposition that he would do it. If
that is objectionable, we can get it with another witness.
"Mr. O'Dell: We would like to be heard on that, may it
please the Court.
"Q. If you are going to take up a lot of time, I will get it
somewhere else."
"Q.

Did your investigation show that Mr. Ripple had been

66 Cclo. 19, 178 P. 571.
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on the wrong side of the road?
"A. Yes, Sir.
"Q. You charged him with a traffic violation?
"A. I charged"Mr. O'Dell: Objection. If it please the Court, I think
we had better take this up in the chambers.
"Q. I can still get it from another witness.
"The Court: Are you withdrawing it?
"Q. All right, now you gave some"Mr. O'Dell: If it please the Court, there is still a matter
here I would like to take up in the chambers.
"Q. I will withdraw the question.
"The Court: Then there is nothing before the Court. You
may proceed."
Even if the plea of guilty had been admissible, it would seem
that it should not be introduced in the manner which was employed in this case. The patrolman could not competently testify
to the matter ascertained by the Court record. Furthermore,
whether a traffic charge was filed could not be material under the
circumstances.
Was it incumbent upon the trial court to strike the questions
from the record and instruct the jury to disregard them, and was
its failure to do so, prejudicial error? It is submitted that counsel
for the Plaintiff should have made a motion asking the Court to
instruct the jury to disregard the statements of counsel if he were
to use it as a basis for reversal and the trial judge was not required
to do more than he did.
In the Ripple case, the Supreme Court relied upon the case of
Warren v. Marsh.' In that case, the Plaintiff had pleaded guilty
before a justice of the peace. In the trial of the civil action, the
Plaintiff was asked if he had entered such a plea and the testimony
was admitted over the objection of the Plaintiff. However, later
the trial court granted a motion for new trial based upon his error.
The Defendant elected to appeal this decision. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota affirmed the decision granting a motion for a new
trial. The Minnesota Court said that apart from statute, such an
2-215

Minn. 615, 11 N.W. (2d) 528.
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admission would be competent evidence. They further stated,
however, that the legislature had closed the door to this inquiry.
The Minnesota Court reasoned that the statute was undoubtedly
passed because of the fact that pleas of guilty to traffic offenses do
not necessarily mean that the Defendant was guilty. Drivers often
plead guilty, prefering to pay a small fine to becoming involved
in a contested court case. The Minnesota Court also pointed out
that the issues in a civil case are quite different from those which
are present in a criminal case.
Whether the Minnesota Court would have taken the same view
of the matter if, as in the principle case, the question had been
withdrawn, is a matter of speculation. In the Minnesota case, the
objectionable evidence was received and undoubtedly the jury was
influenced by it. However, it would seem to me that this factor
provids a basis for distinguishing the Minnesota decision and that
it is not persuasive authority.
In any event, if there has been a question in the past as to
whether a plea of guilty is a conviction within the meaning of
13-4-140, 1953, CRS, the question has now been resolved, although
the opinion does not clearly reveal, that the matter which was offered in Ripple v. Brack was a plea of guilty. This fact is to be
gleaned from the briefs of counsel in the case. Furthermore, if
there has been some question in the past as to whether the mere
effort on the part of counsel to inject such a matter in the record
constitutes prejudicial error, that question has been also unequivocably answered. The desirability, however, of this latter rule is
open to some question. It would seem that the punishment is
somewhat drastic especially in view of the fact that the complaining party was somewhat less than diligent in making his record
and in his efforts to correct the error.
Whether or not the mere asking of improper questions is to be
considered prejudicial, ought to be left to the trial judge who is in
a better position to evaluate such an effect than a reviewing court.
It is interesting to note that the question of admissibility of a
conviction was again considered by the Court in the recent case
of Brown v. Moyle.:' Here in an automobile case, the Plaintiff introduced, and the Court received copies of an information charging the Defendant with manslaughter and a copy of the verdict
finding him guilty. Here the Court made a distinction between a
conviction and a plea of guilty holding that since, in the Brown
case, the evidence received was that of a conviction and not a plea
of guilty, it constituted prejudicial error. It is interesting to note
also that the statute which was the basis for the Court's action in
Ripple v. Brack, did come into play in Brown v. Moyle. The Court
stated in pertinent part as follows:
"At the trial copies of an information charging Brown with
manslaughter in the killing of Moyle, and a copy of the verdict
finding defendant guilty of manslaughter were admitted over
the objection of defendant. This was error. 4 The Courts are
aVol. ViII, C.B.A. Ad. Sh., No. 4, Page 131, December
431 A.L.R. 261

12, 1955.

DICTA

July-August, 1956

almost unanimous in ruling that such evidence, being evidence
of the conviction of a traffic charge of manslaughter based
on the operation of an automobile in a civil case is inadmissible. It is to be noted that defendant did not plead guilty in
the criminal action."
and then said:
"We believe sufficient has been said to support a reversal
of the judgment herein without a discussion of other errors
that may have some merit.***"
It could be argued that the statute in question excluding convictions, applies to manslaughter which is the result of an automobile accident. However, the Court would not invoke the statute
and it carefully noted that the defendant had not entered a plea of
guilty, thus indicating that a distinction is to be drawn between
a plea of guilty and another type of conviction. The Court's recognition that there may possibly be a distinction, makes the reversal
in Ripple v. Brack all the more questionable because it points up
the fact that the legal question is a close one and that a lawyer
could very easily make a good faith mistake in tendering in evidence a plea of guilty. Needless to say, reversal is too drastic under such circumstances.
It is submitted that matters which are peculiarly related to
the trial of the case, should be left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge, and where, as in Ripple v. Brack, the trial judge did not
find that there was prejudice, it would seem that this should not
be disturbed upon review.
As to the statute, it is this writer's viewpoint that it expresses
a salutary policy and that it should, therefore, be given a broad
construction.
Thanks are expressed to Mr. Hamilton for calling attention
to this problem and assurances are herewith given that in the future, the annual review of evidence task will be performed with
more care.
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